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Justice Joseph Story, The Charles River
Bridge Case and the
Crisis of Republicanism
by KENT NEWMYER*
Justice Joseph Story's dissent in the Bridge Case pioneered no
new law. Nor did it successfully reaffirm the old-although con-
servatives like Webster and Kent clung to it as legal gospel. Its im-
portance has not been in law, then, but in legal history, where it
has served as a benchmark from which historians have measured
the distance and direction travelled by American law in the Age of
Jackson.
The well-known question in the Bridge Case was whether the
new free bridge encroached upon the allegedly exclusive toll rights
of the earlier bridge, in violation of the contract clause of the Con-
stitution, as interpreted in Dartmouth College v. Woodward. On
this question the essential difference between Taney and Story, so
most scholars argue, was over means, not ends: I Both, the argu-
ment goes, liked the corporation and assumed that the function of
the law was to facilitate economic progress by releasing its produc-
tive energies. This could be done best, asserted Taney, by prevent-
ing existing corporations from holding back dynamic capital and
technology by inferring monopoly claims from their charters;
accordingly, he refused the old bridge company's claim. Story in-
sisted that corporate expansion required a favorable environment
for investment, which depended in turn on stable, predictable legis-
lative charters, and accordingly he upheld the implied charter
rights asked for by the Charles River Bridge Company.
The Chief Justice opted for "creative destruction," as one re-
cent scholar put it, which is to say that he laid the unavoidable
social costs of economic growth upon static capital. By supporting
*Department of History, University of Connecticut.
1. Stanley I. Kutler's Privilege and Creative Destruction: The Charles
River Bridge Case (1971), is the most recent and the most persuasive
book to make this point. Kutler uses the theory of Willard Hurst to ex-
plore the relationship of the Bridge case to economic expansion and
makes no pretense at exploring the cultural dimensions of the case; nor
does he undertake to analyze fully Story's dissent.
James McClellan's Joseph Story and the American Constitution: A
Study in Political and Legal Thought with Selected Writings (1971), per-
ceives, correctly, I believe, that the dispute between Story and Taney was
cultural as well as legal.
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"privilege" Story made the public pay--either by foregoing a sec-
ond bridge and continuing to pay tolls or by footing the bill for'
compensating the old bridge company under eminent domain.
Taney's law was flexible, pragmatic, and instrumental-simulta-
neously accommodating the dynamic capital and state-based leg-
islative democracy ushered in by the Jacksonians. Story's black
letter tour de force comes off as impractical, inflexible, and nostal-
gic; Story as the "last of the old race of judges," grinding out "old
law" to save vested property rights.
Insightful and useful though it is, this interpretation, espe-
cially as it concerns Story, is incomplete and in some important
respects misleading. It is history written by the winners: the post-
1837 corporate boom is equated with progress, and Taney, post hoc
ergo propter hoc, is given credit for it. Because Story differed from
Taney, because he wrongly prophesied Taney's law would produce
economic stagnation, his own legal position has been dismissed as
backward-looking and unworkable. His dissent, in fact, appears
more as a symbolic foil to the majority's opinion than a serious and
possibly viable alternative to it.
The problem is to avoid anachronism, to take Story seriously,
to reread his opinion with an open mind and to see the Bridge Case
as he saw it-as part of a desperate struggle for the preservation
of Republican society itself.2 To do so, I argue here, would show
(1) that the legal debate between Story and Taney was more funda-
mental than is generally noted and that the difference between
Taney in the Bridge Case and Marshall in the Dartmouth College
Case was basically irreconcilable; (2) that Story and Taney dif-
fered on cultural objectives as well as legal means; (3) that Story's
dissent was less inflexible, more workable, and less preoccupied
with privilege and property and more with morality than is gen-
erally believed. In short, another look at Story's dissent might throw
some light on his legal thinking, his place in American legal his-
tory, and at the same time illuminate something of the interrela-
tion of law and cultural change in the early nineteenth century
United States.
I
The Bridge Case for Story was part of an unmistakable pat-
tern of disaster, which included the resurgence of political parties,
2. Robert E. Shalhope in his "Toward a Republican Synthesis: The
Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in American Histori-
ography," 29, William and Mary Quarterly (January, 1972), argues that
Republicanism is basic to an understanding of American history in the
early nineteenth century. My argument about the Bridge case explores a
dimension of this thesis, and I hope helps to elaborate it.
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the election of Andrew Jackson, the rise of states' rights and nullifi-
cation, the defeat of the Cherokees, the destruction of the Second
Bank of the United States and national economic planning, the
movement for codification of the common law, the death of Mar-
shall and the emergence of the Jacksonian Court. Economic expan-
sion was the issue in the Bridge Case, to be sure, but more funda-
mentally it raised the question of who should make and maintain
the rules of republican society. By what system was the course of
American history to be guided? As Story put it, while listening to
arguments of counsel, "The only question here is of sheer power."3
The power struggle which Story saw, I contend, was between
law and politics-a struggle which originated in the ambiguities
and tensions within Republicanism itself. The original and funda-
mental principle of Republican political theory was sovereignty of
the people, but what the Framers gave to the people with one hand
they took back with the other, for the corollary to popular sover-
eignty was the axiom that law, not men, governed.4 The American
people were sovereign but they could speak in their sovereign ca-
pacity only in organic convention and had spoken only in their
Constitution. Beneath this supreme law, permeating and informing
it, was the common law, which the newly-constituted states made
the foundation of their respective jurisdictions. Law, then, and the
system of courts designed to administer and maintain it, provided
the basic framework of public and private action-one designed,
first, to maximize the individual energies unleashed by the Revolu-
tion (and both the Constitution and the common law took on this
promotive function), and second, to prevent the abuse of public
power by both the magistrates and the people.
No sooner had the Republican system been instituted than
the conflict between popular sovereignty and rule of law began to
manifest itself. Political party was the catalyst: By fusing factions
into a national majority, party organization subverted Madison's
principle that the size of the American republic would prevent
majority tyranny. Party could be effectively used to harmonize the
executive and congress, thus short-circuiting the constitutional sys-
tem of checks and balances. Nor could noblesse oblige be counted
on to preserve rule of law because party undercut the system of
deference by substituting service to party organization for proven
3. [Judge Story's] Memorandums of Arguments in the Supreme
Court of the United States beginning with the Jan [uar] y Term 1831
and ending with the Jan [uarl y Term 1832, p. 4. Ms in Treasure Room,
Harvard Law School Library.
4. My analysis of Republicanism, though not my emphasis, has de-
pended heavily on Gordon Wood, Creation of the American Republic
(1969).
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social status as the test of leadership. And the same erosive effects
were visible on the state as well as national level. With democracy
let loose, the whole system of rule by law seemed in jeopardy. The
people seemed bent on claiming and using their sovereignty. One
by one the barriers fell: Congress, where parties originated, was
the first to go-the Senate proved no more resistant than the House.
State government, already parochial in outlook and mediocre in
talent, was debilitated further by party influence. The presidency,
rather than rising above party, as the Framers planned, had, by the
time of Jackson, become the prize of party and the nerve center of
its operations. The basic Republican principle that the sovereign
people spoke only in constitutional convention was forgotten as the
new breed of professional politicians claimed sovereignty for them-
selves by virtue of their election. Republicanism succumbed to
democracy, law to politics.
But not quite. Congress, the presidency, noblesse oblige were
gone, to be sure, but the Court remained. Under Marshall it had be-
come the final arbiter and guardian of the American legal system.
Only it could bring the people back to their Republican senses and
restore the system of law which kept republican citizens moral and
virtuous. Or so Justice Story and other conservatives desperately
hoped-which brings us to the Charles River Bridge Case.
II
If indeed the Bridge Case reflected a crisis of Republicanism,
as I argue, that fact should be apparent in the legal debate between
Story and Taney. The argument could not be merely a debate over
how best to facilitate corporate growth, nor could it, so far as Story
is concerned, be simply a question of securing property rights. Care-
ful scrutiny of Story's dissent, in fact, shows that the disagreement
was about fundamentals-about basic legal issues, about the role
of the law and the Court in the social-political order-in short,
about law and history.
What appeared on the surface to be a dispute between Story
and Taney over legal rules was in fact a profound disagreement
over law. Although the case was constitutional, both agreed that
the common law should resolve the issue whether the Charles River
Bridge charter by implication conveyed the exclusive right to col-
lect tolls. But beyond this they disagreed sharply. Taney's interpre-
tation of the charter rested on the common law of royal grants.
Story turned to the law of contract. Before he did, however, he met
the Chief Justice on his own ground (a fact which worked to dis-
guise the deep chasm separating their legal positions). The weak-
ness of Taney's analysis of the law of royal grants, Story argued,
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was that he took "a single insulated position" as a "general axiom."'5
Traversing the whole field of authorities which Taney ignored,
Story concluded that Taney's rule of law-that in doubtful cases
the benefit goes to the King and against the adventurers-was
"exclusively confined to cases of mere donation, flowing from the
bounty of the crown." When the grant turned upon valuable con-
sideration, Taney's rule ceases and "the grant is expounded exactly
as it would be in the case of a private grant-favorable to the
grantee."";
Story's scholarly dispute with Taney over authorities is signifi-
cant in itself, as I hope to show later, but what must be emphasized,
what Story took pains to emphasize, was that he differed with
Taney's entire legal frame of reference. The crucial point was, he
declared emphatically, that a bridge charter was "not the case of a
royal grant" and consequently "the rules of common law in relation
to royal grants have, therefore, in reality, nothing to do with the
case." 7 Rather, "we are construing a grant of a legislature, which
though in the form of a statute, is still but a solemn contract.",, It
followed that the majority's arguments about axioms of strict con-
struction, their theories of public welfare which turned on the
analogy of a charter to a royal grant were out-of-bounds.
By resting his argument on private contract, Story raised a
different set of questions and established different ground rules for
their resolution. The legal confrontation was not between the state
and the individual, not between ruler and subject (as in the royal
grant analogy), but between contracting parties of equal author-
ity. The problem, therefore, was not to define special prerogatives
belonging to the state but to determine what two contracting parties
(presumed to be equal in their capacity to negotiate and honorable
in their intentions) meant by their agreement: what was given and
what taken. On this question Story had no trouble in showing that
inferential reasoning was no extraordinary concession demanded
by the counsel for the old bridge but a necessary and legitimate
common law tool of interpretation. As Oliver Wendell Holmes put
it in his discussion of contract in The Common Law, "The very
office of construction is to work out, from what is expressly said and
done, what would have been said with regard to events not definitely
before the minds of the parties, if these events had been consid-
ered."" Common reason, good sense, embodied in common law
axioms of construction, guided the inqury into intent.
5. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge 11 Peters 420, 589 (1837).
6. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge 11 Peters 420, 597.
7. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge 11 Peters 420, 598.
8. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge 11 Peters 420, 603.
9. The Common Law, 237 (1963). Also see 244, 245-46, 251-52, 261.
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Given his premise that private contract law governed the
case, Story's argument is all but irresistible. Mutuality of interest
existed, a meeting of minds and an exchange for consideration had
taken place: The legislature wanted a bridge built across the
Charles; the bridge company wanted to make a profit. For building
the bridge, keeping it in repair, and giving it to the state after forty
years (later extended to seventy), the legislature granted the com-
pany the right to collect tolls. The contingency "not definitely be-
fore the minds of the parties" was whether the toll right was exclu-
sive to the extent that it prohibited the legislature from chartering
an adjacent toll-free bridge. Story put it to the common law and to
"the common sense of every man." Would any sensible business
man, he asked, venture capital in a risky enterprise (which bridg-
ing the Charles in 1785 was), in which the sole profit was the right
to collect tolls, if the legislature reserved the right to destroy those
tolls at any time by chartering an adjacent free bridge?1 0 Even
without explicitly saying so, the legislature recognized the com-
pany's exclusive right to take tolls, Story argued, because it was
equipped with the same common sense that the businessmen
had and because, in the eyes of the law, it was presumed to have
bargained in good faith. Any doubt about the legislature's intent
to grant exclusive tolls was removed by the compensation awarded
to Harvard for destroying its ferry rights by chartering the Charles
River Bridge and by the thirty-year extension of the original charter
to the old Bridge Company as compensation for chartering another
bridge across the Charles in 1792 which might have diminished
the old company's tolls. And when the exclusive right was given,
"the law giveth, impliedly, whatever is necessary for the taking and
enjoying the same."
Story's argument not only follows Dartmouth College but
lays bare the radical implications of that decision. Not merely were
grants and charters within the meaning of Article I, Section 10 of
the Constitution, but they were to be interpreted according to
private law. Taney and the majority refused to be bound by this
logic. They did not overrule Dartmouth College, to be sure, but
neither did they merely refuse to extend it by implication. By talk-
ing royal grants instead of private contract, Taney's opinion simply
ignored Dartmouth College altogether-which is what Story per-
ceived.
III
He also perceived with even greater distress that Taney's
refusal to apply the rigorous logic of contract undercut the moral
foundations of Republicanism. For no other area of law in the nine-
10. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge 11 Peters 420 at 608-609.
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teenth century was so laden with cultural baggage, none so con-
genial to Republican society, as was contract." As Western and
American society moved from corporateness to individualism, as
the model of the new American man changed from a passive,
delimited, class bound one to a rational, self-sufficient creature of
volition, contract emerged as the necessary basis of social order.
The movement of history in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries was, in fact, as Sir Henry Maine aptly phrased it, from status
to contract.
By the contract device, American Puritans established their
individual and collective relationship to their God and bound them-
selves together in churches and civil communities. From religion,
the colonial experience, the English legal heritage, and the influ-
ence of John Locke, contract entered into the fabric of Republican
political thought. To be sure, Republicanism emphasized individual
responsibility to a greater whole, and the principles of popular
sovereignty and representative government somewhat undercut
the contractual relationship between the rulers and the people.
But contract was made to justify the Revolution itself and it was
the Lockean theory of social contract that best explained how a
nation of free, rational, individual men could form itself into the
collective sovereign people, What was true politically was equally
true economically. As the American people moved progressively
toward laissez faire capitalism, contract emerged as that area of
law central to economic expansion. As such it was-along with
provisions against retrospective legislation, which is in fact part of
contract in the broadest sense-guaranteed by the Constitution
itself. When Marshall applied the law of private contract to gov-
ernmental economic activities, then he was merely following the
syntactic imperative of culture to integrate and harmonize: 12
private law became public law; common law infused constitu-
tional law; private morality became synonymous with public, re-
publican morality.
It was this permeating morality of contract which Story
aimed to preserve in his Bridge dissent (and both he and Kent used
the word "moral" to describe the contract issue). By shifting from
contract to royal grant, Taney subtly but surely effected a shift in
11. Willard Hurst noted that "the years 1800-1875 were... above all
else years of contract in our law." Law and Conditions of Freedom in the
Nineteenth Century United States 18. See Wood, Creation of the Amer-
ican Republic, 282, 288, 289, for reference to contract in the thinking of
the framers of the Constitution.
12. Gerald Garvey, Constitutional Bricolage (1971) has some fine in-
sights on the integration of American law and culture, on what he calls
the buyer-seller mode of social organization.
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cultural values from a social order based on a buyer-seller model-
where the individual was the basic unit of social organization,
where contract was the means of collective action, and moral
standards and legal ones, too, were internal and individualized-
to the ruler-subject model which introduced a notion of public good
outside and beyond individuals, one subject to state determination.
Story's repudiation of this cultural shift was explicit. He did
not deny that the legislature could enter into the individualistic,
laissez faire economic process, indeed assumed that it would do so
to stimulate individual activity and thus promote public welfare
(as when it chartered the Charles River Bridge Company). But
once the legislature entered the economic arena through grants
and charters, it was governed by the same laws as applied to
individuals-that is, by private contract law. "Our legislatures
neither have, nor affect to have, any royal prerogatives," declared
Story, referring to Taney's mistaken analogy of a legislative charter
to a royal grant. Indeed, the Massachusetts legislature has no claim
to sovereignty whatsoever. Only the people are sovereign, he con-
tinued-applying the Federalist constitutional theory of 1787 to
the states-and the people in their sovereign capacity speak only
in their constitutions. "What solid ground is there to say [then],
that the words of a grant, in the mouth of a citizen, shall mean one
thing, and in the mouth of the legislature shall mean another
thing?" 1:3 In short, public welfare was not some external value
which a sovereign legislature could call on when it pleased to con-
trol the economic process. Public economic good was the collective
product of individual effort and of contractual relationships be-
tween individuals (under which category Story put both the state
legislatures and the business corporations). There was no disjunc-
tion between mercantilism and free enterprise. One morality gov-
erned all-or with the help of the law might be made to do so.
What Story wanted to achieve through law was not just economic
expansion, as some historians have assumed, but economic ex-
pansion and the preservation of Republican morality. Indeed, in
his dire forecast about the effect of Taney's opinion, he went the
final step to argue that only with such morality could progress be
achieved.
History disproved Story's proposition that contractual morality
as he laid it out in his dissent was the sine qua non of corporate
expansion. But what about his formula for a moral economic
growth, i.e., economic expansion that would not undercut the basic
principle of private contract? Two arguments against its viability
need to be considered briefly: first, that Story's legal formula for
13. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Peters 420 at 602.
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morality worked only against the legislature and not the corpora-
tion, and, second, that it would not work at all.
Concerning the allegation that Story's morality was mainly
a device for obscuring his pro-corporate, private property bias:
Assuredly, Story worked through the law (public and private) to
make the corporation an effective vehicle for capitalist expansion.
Nor can it be denied that he viewed state legislatures as obstacles
to corporate growth. But it did not follow that he wanted an un-
regulated corporation, one free from the constraints of Republican
morality. After all, it was Story's concurrence in Dartmouth College
that recognized the right of state legislatures to reserve, in their
charters, the power to regulate corporations-providing only that
the reservation clause was explicit, so that the corporation could
accept or reject legislative terms. In Story's scheme, however, it was
not the legislature but the courts, working especially in the realm
of private contract law, that would mainly hold corporations to their
moral duties. Using much the same reasoning he applied against
the legislature in the Bridge Case-that is, by using the rational,
fair-minded, practical individual as the rule-giving model-Story
worked to enlarge corporate duties and responsibilities. In Bank
of Columbia v. Patterson's Administrator (1813), 14 the
Judge departed from existing authorities to make corporations lia-
ble for contracts not under corporate seal made by their author-
ized agents. His Bank of the United States v. Dandridge opinion
(1827)'1 extended that principle to cover obligations entered into
by cashiers of banking corporations. In effect both cases established
contractual duties by construction and implication, by the same
reasoning, in short, that would guide Story in the Bridge Case.
He also worked to hold corporations to a strict performance of con-
tracts made with private parties as in his pioneering opinion in
Mumma v. The Potomac Company (1834),16 which announced
the doctrine that a corporation's contract survives its dissolution
and that the capital stock of dissolved corporations becomes a trust
fund for the satisfaction of debts against the corporation. Story
also accepted the doctrine emerging in state courts of corporate
liability for torts, and he knew and counted on the traditional com-
mon law writ of mandamus and the doctrine of ultra vires as
remedies against corporations that exceeded their charter rights
or failed to perform duties imposed upon them. In short, Story
made the same Republican assumptions about corporations that
he made about individuals and legislatures-that law, especially
14. 7 Cranch 299 (1813).
15. 12 Wheaton 64 (1827).
16. 8 Peters 281 (1834).
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law administered by the courts, could make them responsible and
moral.
Now what about the argument that Story's dissent would not
have worked at all-that it would have forestalled corporate ex-
pansion by fortifying existing corporations with monopoly protec-
tion? It cannot be denied that Story's ruling would have worked to
slow down and restrain corporate growth; and in a real sense that
was his intention. But it does not follow that his dissent precluded
considerable economic advancement. Even in the area of most
obvious applicability-that of bridges-Story's opinion offered no
absolute monopoly protection to existing corporations. First, an
implied grant of exclusive rights, even if successfully claimed,
would last only for the period of time set by legislative discretion.
(For example, the Charles River Bridge would have reverted to the
state in 1855.) And if existing charters were subject to monopolistic
interpretations, future ones could explicitly deny such interpreta-
tions if the legislature so willed. Nor did Story's ruling preclude the
building of other bridges even during the period of the grant and
such bridges had, in fact, been built across the Charles. Whether
existing bridges could claim monopoly rights against new bridges
depended on the extent to which a second bridge damaged the
revenue of existing bridges, which was necessarily a question of
degree-a question, in short, for future courts to decide on new
facts. Story made clear, both in his manuscript notes on the argu-
ments and in his opinion, that the Court's decision was limited
strictly to the case at hand and was "not to decide the principles for
all cases ... .'7 His ruling put no dead hand on future courts.
If Story's concession to the old bridge company did not rule
out new bridges, then how can historians be so certain that it would
have unreasonably curtailed the growth of railroad corporations?
The fact that existing canal and turnpike companies tried to stop
railroads by arguing implied monopoly does not prove the point.
It is one thing to argue that a charter to a canal corporation would
by implication preclude parallel canals (for the duration of the
grant), quite another that such a charter would automatically pre-
clude parallel railroads. The important point is that future courts
could distinguish between a canal and a railroad in such matters
as function and termini, and Story's contention about the limited
scope of the Bridge ruling would invite them to do so. Certainly the
touchstones of common sense and business acumen by which the
common law presumed to read the mind of contracting parties
would not apply so irresistibly as in the Bridge Case. And perhaps
17. [Judge Story's] Memorandums of Arguments, op. cit. supra note
3, at p. 161.
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most importantly, legislatures could and surely would make sure
in future charters to guarantee against implied monopoly in areas
of new technology.
The argument is speculative of necessity, but the idea that
Story saw and provided for controlled economic growth is certainly
consistent with the promotive thrust of his entire legal system. At
the very least, doesn't he deserve a "Scotch verdict" on the question
of workability?
IV
Story's dissent reveals much about his system of law and about
the role he designed for the Court (which follows logically from his
system). The law which Story fashioned to save the Republic from
the onslaught of democracy in the Bridge dissent was neither moral
and idealistic, scientific and rational, nor pragmatic and instru-
mental-it was all of these together. And it was, I suggest, the same
ingredients fashioned in the same organic manner that constitute
Story's larger system of law as revealed in his remarkable and
varied legal career as judge, scholar, and teacher,
Certainly no lawyer of the age save Kent was so committed to
making law technically, scientifically pure. Witness his teaching
at Harvard Law School, his series of commentaries on various
branches of the law, his popular articles in encyclopedias, law
journals, and general periodicals, and especially his scholarly opin-
ions (and more especially his opinions on circuit), 8 which were
designed to educate as much as to decide the controversies. But
legal science was not an end in itself. The first lesson Story learned
from his tutor Sam Sewall, 19 the same he saw practiced in the
court of Chief Justice Theophilus Parsons, was that inherited legal
principles, even from the superb Blackstone, were imperfect and
incomplete and would have to be shaped and molded to fit the spe-
cial needs of the American people. As judge and jurist, he made
scholarship walk in the street, the marketplace, and the counting
house. While he started his legal inquiries with black letter, he was
also guided by the usages of commerce and business with which
he was intimately acquainted. And for all his respect for inherited
principles, he never hesitated to depart from or go beyond them if
practical necessity required-as in his conception of public and
private corporations, 20 his doctrine of the contractual responsibil-
18. Kent Newmyer, "Justice Joseph Story on Circuit and a Neglected
Phase of American Legal History," 14 American Journal of Legal History
(April, 1970), 125-26.
19. Samuel Sewall to Story, Philadelphia, February 12, 1799. Story
Papers. Clements Library. University of Michigan.
20. See his concurrence in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4
Wheaton 518 at 666, 669 (1819).
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ities of corporate agents, or the binding nature of parole contracts.
It was this very same practical, creative legal scientist who argued
strenuously that Christianity was a part of the common law,2"
who, of all judges of the period, revered and retained natural law
notions of the eternal, unchanging and moral principles of juris-
prudence.
Story never got his system entirely together, unfortunately
never analyzed it or philosophized about it, never resolved the ten-
sions within it which came from his effort to fuse so many diver-
gent ingredients. Story the lawyer was like a geographer and map
maker. He looked idealistically to the day when the whole of God's
creation would be explored and mapped out with scientific rules
and precise predictable relationships so that human action might
be rational, equitable and productive. But he knew in fact that the
job was not done, that old maps would have to be modified and new
areas charted. Law was both substance and process; fixed rules
and the science of modifying and making them; map making and
the final map, science and mystery.
If Republican law was so complex and so delicate, and if legal
science was so demanding, it followed that lawyers and judges,
not professional politicians and legislators, should be entrusted
with the main duty of law-keeping and law-making. And herein lay
Story's final argument with Taney in the Bridge Case, for the Chief
Justice conceded too much authority to the legislature and profes-
sional politicians Who then ruled there. By arguing that there was
some principle of public welfare beyond the operation of the buyer-
seller contractual process and by conceding that the legislature had
some special prerogative to voice that principle, Taney came dan-
gerously close to the ultimate democratic heresy-the very one
presumably stamped out by Republican constitutional theory-that
the legislature itself and not the people was sovereign.
But even more troubling to Story than Taney's concession to
legislative power was his demonstrated incompetence in the Bridge
opinion to exercise the responsibilities that Story would have given
to the Court. It was a matter of scholarship. That Taney should mis-
read the authorities on royal grants was one thing, but not to con-
sult them was another, and to misconstrue the entire legal frame-
work of the case was even worse. Taney was either cynical or
incompetent; though Story did not say so, it is a good guess that he
agreed with Webster that Taney's performance, however "plausi-
ble," was ultimately "cunning and jesuitical." But whether cynical
or inept, the result was disastrous, for by abandoning the rational
21. James McClellan, Joseph Story and the American Constitution
(1971), pp. 118-159.
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system of scientific inquiry and the struggle for objectivity, the
Court launched itself on a turbulent sea of judicial subjectivism.
Without scholarship and legal science, political opinion would
take over. Rather than controlling politics and party, Taney and
the majority now invited them into the temple. Tragic enough it
would have been had the Court gone to defeat doing its moral duty
(as in the Cherokee Indian Case), but to surrender without battle
was ignominy. The old Republic seemed lost.
V
Story's position in the 1830's was remarkably analogous to
Jonathan Edwards' in the Great Awakening in that both attempted
to maintain the unity and coherence of an earlier social system
which was disintegrating under the impact of rapid historical
change. Edwards wanted to preserve Puritanism as a way of life:
Story aimed to save Republicanism. For Edwards, society's salva-
tion lay in the permeating spirit of true religion; for Story in true
law. Story's system of law like Edwards' theology was organic and
synthetic like the culture it hoped to conserve-that is to say, it
reached out to integrate politics, economics, and other aspects of
society into a harmonious and moral community.
Story's undertaking was conservative in the largest sense (per-
haps American conservatism comes of age with him). But it does
not follow that his legal system was static or retrogressive. Natural
law assumptions of the eighteenth century permeated his legal
thinking, to be sure, but he harmonized them, as Blackstone did
earlier, with rational, systematic legal science. And to this fusion
of morality and science he added a pragmatic instrumentalism
quite alien to the eighteenth century common law-a pragmatism
which was designed to bring law into harmony with the unique
demands of American history. His own protestations to the contrary
nonwithstanding, Story was not "the last of the old race of judges"
but was a transitional figure who was simultaneously a rationalist
and a romantic idealist, a conservative and an innovator, who at a
particularly fertile moment in American history tried to fashion an
American jurisprudence. His system of law, the parts of which
never quite coalesced, is not so much an indication to legal histori-
ans of what American law was, as a creative vision of what it might
have been.
Antebellum law-of which Taney's Bridge opinion was an
intimation-moved away from Story's organic model: Instrumen-
talism broke the moral confines Story attempted to impose and
American law took its character more and more, as Willard Hurst
shows, from the chaotic forces of economic expansion. A new model
of the law of economic growth responsive to new technology and
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mature capital replaced the old commercial one designed to pro-
mote investment by securing it absolutely. 22 Natural law thinking
fell into the background where it served to legitimize the new law
(and not incidentally to obscure the realities of legal development
and retard the rise of a self-conscious jurisprudence). At the same
time, law-making initiative began to shift from the Court (to which
Story had entrusted his delicately balanced system) to the legisla-
ture, where the new forces of instrumentalism operated with less
hindrance and restraint. Story's model lawyer-statesman-a moral
and virtuous natural aristocrat who mastered all branches of law,
knew the real world, and devoted himself to polite learning and
public service-gave way to legal specialists and lawyer-politicians.
To be sure, bits and pieces of Story's system would be incorpo-
rated into the main stream of American law. His arguments would
bolster future judicial conservatives in their battle against legisla-
tive dominance. But his system, the legal cosmology he fashioned
to save the old Republic, would become a relic of history, a curiosity
on Clio's junkpile. But still history's losers deserve their day even if
only to show the complex process by which the victors carried the
field-and possibly to show the price paid for their victory.
22. I would like to thank Professor Morton Horwitz of Harvard Law
School for giving me his insights on this point.
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